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Criminal Procedure
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-GRAND JURY-WITNESS HAS A LIMITED
RIGHT TO CHALLENGE LEGALITY OF A WIRETAP BY EXAMINING
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING THE COURT ORDER
PERMITTING THE WIRETAP.
In re Grand Jury Investigation (John Harkins) (1980)
On March 26, 1980, John Harkins appeared before a federal grand
jury and, invoking his fifth amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination,1 refused to answer any questions other than to give his
name and address.2 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania granted use immunity 3 for Harkins' testimony,
but Harkins again refused to testify and the court scheduled a contempt
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. In re Grand Jury Investigation (John Harkins), 624 F.2d 1160, 1162(3d Cir. 1980).
3. Id. Use immunity prohibits the use of a witness's compelled testimony,
and the evidence derived directly or indirectly therefrom, in any manner relat-
ing to a criminal prosecution of the witness. Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 453 (1972); 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976). Section 6002 provides in
pertinent part:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-
incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding
before or ancillary to -
(1) a court or grand jury of the United States .... and the per-
son presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness
an order issued under [18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976)], the wit-
ness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of
his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other
information compelled under the order (or any information di-
rectly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other infor-
mation) may be used against the witness in any criminal case,
except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or
otherwise failing to comply with the order.
Id. at § 6002.
Section 6003 provides that a United States district court may order an
individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to
give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination when
the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to
the public interest. Id. § 6003.
Transactional immunity, on the other hand, is a grant of full immunity
from prosecution for offenses to which the compelled testimony relates. Kas-
tigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 453. A typical transactional immunity
statute provides immunity from "any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which [the witness] may tes-
tify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise." Id. at 451, quoting Act
of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 (repealed 1970). The United States
Government replaced the transactional immunity approach with use immunities
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hearing.4 Harkins subsequently served subpoenas on the government,
demanding information concerning the use of electronic surveillance
as the basis for the grand jury's questions.5 On April 7, 1980, the dis-
trict court held a hearing, not regarding the contempt citation, but
to consider a motion by the United States Attorney to quash Harkins'
subpoenas.6 The government conceded that electronic surveillance
formed the basis for some of the grand jury's questions, but the district
court nevertheless quashed the subpoenas.7 Harkins' counsel then in-
formed the court that Harkins would no longer make a general refusal
to testify.8 Before appearing before the grand jury however, Harkins
moved to quash the government's subpoena for his testimony on the
ground that the questions he would be asked were based on illegal wire-
taps of his communications. 9 The district court found that the docu-
ments authorizing the wiretaps were facially valid and therefore ordered
Harkins to testify.10 Harkins appeared before the grand jury, but re-
4. 624 F.2d at 1162. Use immunity for Harkins' testimony had been
granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976). 624 F.2d at 1162. For
a discussion of these sections, see note 3 supra. After Harkins' second refusal
to testify, the court scheduled a contempt hearing for April 7, 1980. 624 F.2d
at 1162.
5. 624 F.2d at 1162. Harkins served the subpoenas on three assistant
United States Attorneys and two F.B.I. agents. Id. The subpoenas requested,
inter alia, information concerning:
1. Whether or not the information sought concerns any one particu-
lar investigation and if so:
a. has the government obtained any evidence via electronic sur-
veillance;
b. have the speakers on any tapes made via electronic surveillance
been identified;
c. are the alleged crimes being investigated alleged to have oc-
curred between September 1, 1974 and February 10, 1977.
Id. at 1162-63 n.2.
6. Id. at 1162. The district court had scheduled a contempt hearing for
April 7, 1980. Id. At the hearing, however, the court stated: "All we are
discussing right now is a motion to [quash the] subpoena, the subpoena which
you served on the United States Attorney's office. That is all we are discussing."
Id. at 1163 n.3.
7. Id. at 1163. The district court was informed by the United States Attor-
ney that Harkins had been provided with an inventory of the electronic sur-
veillance prior to the April 7th hearing, but that no information had been
provided. Id. at 1163 n.4. The district court quashed Harkins' subpoenas
on the ground that Harkins had no right to any further information. Id. at
1163.
8. Id. at 1163. The court then allowed Harkins to return to the grand
jury to answer questions. Id. The court, however, warned Harkins that if
he should persist in his refusal to testify, a contempt hearing would be held.
Id.
9. Id. At a hearing held that morning, the government responded that
the questions were based on a legal wiretap authorized by a court order. Id.
For a discussion of the exclusionary rule of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, see notes 26-32 and accompanying text supra.
10. 624 F.2d at 1163. The district court examined the court order which
authorized the wiretap, the Attorney General's application and an accompany-
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fused to answer some of the questions posed and was subsequently held
in contempt."
Harkins appealed the contempt order contending, inter alia, that
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title
III or Act) 12 requires that he be given both access to the government
documents supporting the facially valid court order and a plenary hear-
ing in order to introduce witnesses and evidence challenging the suffi-
ciency of these documents. 13 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit 14 vacated the contempt order, holding that, absent
a showing by the government of a need for secrecy, a witness before
a grand jury who is asked questions based on information obtained
through the use of electronic surveillance has a right to examine the
court order authorizing the surveillance, the Attorney General's applica-
tion for and affidavit supporting the court order, and the government
affidavit indicating the duration of the surveillance. In re Grand Jury
Investigation (John Harkins), 624 F.2d 1160 (3d Cir. 1980).
The grand jury functions as an investigative body which fulfills
the dual purposes of issuing indictments for alleged criminal behavior
and protecting citizens from unfounded criminal prosecutions. 15 Be-
ing affidavit in camera. Id. The court then denied Harkins' further request
for a hearing on the legality of the wiretap. Id. Both the district court and
the Third Circuit interpreted Harkins' request for a full hearing as an assertion
of a right to examine the documents supporting the court order and to intro-
duce evidence in support of the allegation that the wiretap was in fact illegal.
Id. at 1163 n.5.
11. Id. at 1163-64. Harkins responded to all but five of the questions
posed. Id. The district court held Harkins in contempt, denying his request
for a contempt hearing, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976). Section 1826(a)
provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any
court or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause
shown to comply with an order of the court to testify ...the court,
upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention,
may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such
time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such
information ...
Id. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Bruno), 545 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1976).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2620 (1976).
13. 624 F.2d at 1164. Harkins also argued that the district court failed to
provide him with a required contempt hearing in which he could raise any
grounds to show that he had just cause to refuse to testify. Id.
14. The case was heard by Judges Adams, Van Dusen and Higginbotham.
Judge Higginbotham wrote the opinion. Judge Garth dissented from the
court's July 21, 1980 denial of rehearing en banc. See 624 F.2d at 1168-69
(Denial of Rehearing) (Garth, J., dissenting).
15. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 556-57 (1884).
See generally, Note, Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 - Grand Jury Witness
Who Has Been Granted Transactional Immunity May Refuse to Answer Ques-
tions Which Are Based Upon Information Derived From Unauthorized Elec-
tronic Surveillance, 17 VIL. L. REV. 524, 525-27 (1972).
The importance of the grand jury is explicitly recognized in the United
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cause the grand jury is not a judicial forum, but an inquisitorial body,16-
it is not constrained by the rigid procedural or evidentiary rules which
are employed in criminal trials.17 This principle was recently re-
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Calan-
dra.i8 In Calandra, the Court held that a grand jury witness could
not refuse to answer questions on the ground that the questions were
based on evidence allegedly obtained from an unlawful search and
seizure made in violation of the fourth amendment. 19 The Court
found that the need for effective and expeditious discharge of the grand
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury ...... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. See Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919) (witnesses before a
rand jury are not entitled to take exception to the jurisdiction of the grand'
jury or the court over the subject matter under investigation).
17. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (grand jury wit-
ness could not refuse to answer questions on the ground that the questions,
were based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure in vio-
lation of his fourth amendment rights); Blue v. United States, 384 U.S. 251
(1966) (the fact that evidence obtained in violation of the petitioner's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination was presented to the grand jury
was not a basis for either abating the prosecution pending a new indictment, or
barring it altogether); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (facially
invalid indictments cannot be challenged on the grounds that they are not
supported by adequate or competent evidence); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S.
273 (1919) (grand jury witnesses may not take exception to the subject matterjurisdiction of the grand jury or the court). See generally Note, supra note 15,
at 525-27.
18. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Pursuant to a search warrant issued in connection
with an extensive gambling investigation, federal agents conducted a thorough,
four-hour search of respondent's place of business and seized certain evidence
from his business files. Id. at 340. Calandra later moved for suppression and
return of the seized evidence. Id. at 341. The district court granted Calan-
dra's motion, finding that the search warrant had been issued without probable
cause and that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. Id. at 342. The
district court held that the constitutional guarantee of due process allows a
witness to litigate whether the grand jury's evidence was obtained in violation
of the witness's fourth amendment rights. Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of the respondent's motion and held that the exclusionary
rule may be invoked by a grand jury witness to bar questioning based on evi-
dence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. Id. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a grand jury witness
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence
obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. Id. at 339.
19. Id. at 350. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained from a
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be used in
a criminal proceeding against the victim of that illegal search and seizure.
Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 393, 398 (1914). The purpose of the rule is to deter unlawful police
conduct by removing the incentive to disregard the fourth amendment right of
all citizens to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects. Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
The Calandra Court found the deterrent effect of extending the exclusion-
ary rule to grand jury proceedings to be uncertain at best. 414 U.S. at 351.
But cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (grand jury subpoenas based
on illegally seized evidence held to be invalid). For a discussion of the
Calandra Court's rationale in distinguishing Silverthorne Lumber, see note 63
infra.
[VOL. 26: p. 667
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jury's duties outweighed any incremental benefit which might accrue
from extending the exclusionary rule to the grand jury witness. 20
Evidence which is obtained by electronic surveillance must be ex-
cluded at trial unless the surveillance is authorized under Title 111,21
which provides that interception of a wire or oral communication will
be lawful only if a detailed application for a court order approving or
authorizing the interception is submitted to a judge of competent juris-
diction.2 2 Title III was the result of congressional efforts to strike a
balance between the competing needs for effective criminal investiga-
tions and the protection of privacy interests in wire communications.238
In order to protect both the privacy of communications and the in-
tegrity of the courts, 24 Title III delineates, on a uniform basis, the cir-
cumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and
oral communications may be authorized.2 5
The exclusionary rule for unauthorized wiretaps is embodied in
section 2515 of the Act.26 Although the language of section 2515 would
20. 414 U.S. at 349-52. The Court was concerned that grand jury pro-
ceedings would be turned into preliminary trials on the merits. Id. The Court
stated: "Suppression hearings would halt the orderly progress of an investiga-
tion and might necessitate extended litigation of issues only tangentially re-
lated to the grand jury's primary objective." Id. at 349. For a brief discussion
of the exclusionary rule, see note 19 supra.
21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
22. See id. § 2518(1). After receiving the application, if the judge deter-
mines that: I) there is probable cause to believe that the individual has com-
mitted or will commit certain specified types of offenses; 2) there is probable
cause to believe that particular communications will be obtained through the
use of the wiretaps; 3) normal investigative procedures have failed, or appear
either unlikely to succeed or too dangerous to attempt; and 4) there is prob-
able cause to believe that the facilities to be wiretapped are or will be used
in connection with the commission of one of the enumerated offenses, then
the judge may enter an order authorizing the wiretap. Id. § 2518(2), (3). Each
order authorizing a wiretap must specify the basic facts concerning the wire-
tap. Id. § 2518(4). Furthermore, each order has a maximum time limit of
30 days, unless an extension request is filed. Id. § 2518(5).
23. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2 Sess. 66-67 reprinted in 11968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2153-63 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
24. See Senate Report, supra note 23, at 89, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2177.
25. See id. at 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. Se AD. NEws 2112,
2153.
26. See 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1976). Section 2515 states:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted,
no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence
derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hear-
ing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, depart-
ment, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other
authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof
if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter.
Id. The Act also provides that any person who intercepts wire or oral com-
munications in an unauthorized manner may be subject to civil and criminal
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seem to indicate that the exclusionary rule should have broad applica-
tion,27 the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress intended
section 2515 to be limited by section 2518(10)(a).2 8 Section 2518(10)(a)
defines when a motion to suppress may be made by an aggrieved per-
son.2 9 In so doing, it provides the remedy for the exclusionary right
created by section 2515.30 Although grand jury proceedings are specifically
included in the section 2515 exclusionary rule,3 1 section 2518(10)(a)
does not specifically list a grand jury proceeding as a proceeding in which
a motion to suppress may be made.32
27. For the text of § 2515, see note 26 supra. The language of § 2515
seems to have potential for broad application because the section provides that
no part of the contents, and no evidence derived from any unlawfully inter-
cepted communication may be used before a grand jury. See id. For a dis-
cussion of a court holding that § 2515 should be interpreted broadly, see notes
33-40 and accompanying text infra.
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976). Section 2518(10)(a) states:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or be-
fore any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other
authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or
oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds
that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order
of authorization or approval.
Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing, or proceeding
unless there was no opportunity to make such motion or the person
was not aware of the grounds of the motion. If the motion is granted,
the contents of the intercepted wire or oral communication, or evi-
dence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained
in violation of this chapter. The judge, upon the filing of such mo-
tion by the aggrieved person, may in his discretion make available to
the aggrieved person or his counsel for inspection such portions of the
intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom as the judge
determines to be in the interests of justice.
Id. See Senate Report, supra note 23, at 106, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2195. The Senate Report indicates that § 2518(10)(a)
is to be read as limiting sections 2515 and 2517. Id.
29. See note 28 supra. Section 2510(11) defines an aggrieved person as a
person who was a party to any intercepted wire or oral communication, or a
person against whom the interception was directed. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) (1976).
The Supreme Court has noted that only an aggrieved person may move to
suppress the contents of a wire or oral communicatin intercepted in violation
of the Act. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 n.9 (1969).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1976); Senate Report, supra note 23, at
106, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2195. For the
text of § 2518(10)(a), see note 28 supra.
31. For the text of § 2515, see note 26 supra.
32. For the text of § 2518(10)(a), see note 28 supra. It is possible to
argue that section 2518 (10)(a) impliedly includes grand jury proceedings be-
cause it provides for a suppression motion in any proceeding before any
authority of the United States. Id. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Har-
risburg, Pennsylvania (Egan), 450 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'd on other
[VOL. 26: p. 667
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The interaction of sections 2515 and 2518(10)(a) was examined by
the United States Supreme Court in Gelbard v. United States.3 3 The
petitioners in Gelbard had been incarcerated pursuant to the Recal-
citrant Witness Act,3 4 for refusing to answer grand jury questions which
were based on evidence obtained from illegal wiretaps.3 5 The Court
held that where interrogation is based upon illegal interception of the
witness' communications, the witness may invoke section 2515 as a
defense to contempt charges brought on the basis of his refusal to obey
grounds sub nom. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). For a discus-
sion of In re Egan, see note 33 infra.
The Senate Report which accompanied the Act however, explained the
omission as follows:
Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the
provision does not envision the making of a motion to suppress in the
context of such a proceeding itself. Normally, there is no limitation
on the character of evidence that may be presented to a grand jury,
which is enforcible by an individual. There is no intent to change
this general rule. It is the intent of the provision only that when
a motion to suppress is granted in another context, its scope may in-
clude use in a future grand jury proceeding.
Senate Report, supra note 23, at 106, reprinted in [1968] U.S, CODE CONG. &C
AD. NEws 2112, 2195 (citation omitted).
33. 408 U.S. 41 (1972), rev'g 443 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1971). The Ninth
Circuit had decided that grand jury witnesses were not entitled to use § 2515 as
a defense in a contempt proceeding. 443 F.2d at 838. The government, pur-
suant to a court approved wiretap, had intercepted conversations between an
alleged bookmaker and the petitioners. 408 U.S. at 44. The petitioners
appeared before a federal grand jury which had been convened to investigate
possible violations of federal gambling laws. Id. The petitioners refused to
answer any questions until they were afforded an opportunity to litigate the
legality of the interceptions. Id. The petitioners were held in contempt by
the District Court for the Central District of California and were incarcerated
pursuant to the Recalcitrant Witness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976). 408
U.S. 44-45. For the pertinent text of the Recalcitrant Witness Act, see note 11
supra.
The Third Circuit, adopting the contrary rule, had held that witnesses
were entitled to use § 2515 as a defense in a contempt proceeding in certain
circumstances. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
(Egan), 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971), afJ'd on other grounds sub nom. Gelbard
v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). In Egan, the respondents were granted
transactional immunity in return for their testimony. 450 F.2d at 200. The
respondents, however, refused to answer the grand jury's questions on the
ground that the questions were based on illegal wiretaps. Id. at 201. Follow-
ing a hearing, the petitioners were held in contempt and sentenced to in-
carceration. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. Id. at 221. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to resolve the contrary deci-
sions of the Third and Ninth Circuits. 408 U.S. at 44.
34. 408 U.S. at 44-47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976). For the text of§ 1826(a), see note 11 supra.
35. 408 U.S. at 44-47. The majority decided the case based upon the
assumption that the communications were not intercepted in accordance with
the provisions of Title III of the Act. Id. at 47.
7
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a court order to testify before the grand jury.8 6 The Court based its
decision on a broad reading of the exclusionary rule provided by sec-
tion 2515 87 and on the belief that a contempt hearing for refusal to
testify is a proceeding separate and distinct from a grand jury pro-
ceeding.38
The Gelbard majority specifically left undecided the issue of whether
the grand jury witnesses would have been entitled to invoke a section
2515 defense in a contempt proceeding, if the interception of the con-
versation had been pursuant to a court order.8 9 Since Gelbard, the
36. Id.
37. Id. at 47-52. The Court found that protection of privacy was an over-
riding congressional concern in the passage of Title III of the Act and that§ 2515 was designed to secure the privacy rights of the individual. Id. at 48.
The Court declared that to order a grand jury witness to testify regarding evi-
dence barred by the unequivocal terms of § 2515 would thwart the congres-
sional objective of protecting individual privacy and would entangle the courts
in the illegal acts of government agents. Id. at 50-51. The Court concluded:
"In sum, Congress simply cannot be understood to have sanctioned orders to
produce evidence excluded from grand jury proceedings by §2515." Id.
38. Id. at 59-61. The Court distinguished the situation of a grand jury
witness who has refused to testify and attempts to defend a subsequent charge
of contempt from that of a defendant who moves to have his indictment dis-
missed because the government presented illegally acquired evidence to the
grand jury. Id. at 60. Hence, the Court did not accept the arguments that
the Senate report expressed the view that a grand jury witness should be fore-
closed from raising the § 2515 defense in a contempt proceeding for refusing
to testify. Id. For the text of the Senate Report to which the Court was
referring, see note 32 supra.
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Douglas, Stewart, White, and Marshall joined. 408 U.S. at 41. Justice Douglas
filed a concurring opinion declaring his belief that the fourth amendment shields
a grand jury witness from any question which is based upon information
acquired through searches which invade his own constitutionally protected
privacy. Id. at 62 (Douglas, J., concurring). justice White also filed a con-
curring opinion, stating that when the United States has intercepted communi-
cations without obtaining a required warrant it is appropriate not to require
the grand jury witness to answer. Id. at 70 (White, J., concurring). Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Powell,
filed a dissenting opinion contending that the right of a grand jury witness
to refuse to testify should not be expanded in light of the historical role of
the grand jury and the legislative history of the Act. Id. at 71-91. (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
39. 408 U.S. at 61 n.22. In his concurring opinion, Justice White indi-
cated that the Court might have reached a different conclusion if the inter-
ception had been authorized by court order. Id. at 69 (White, .., concurring).
Justice White stated:
Where the Government produces a court order for the intercep-
tion, however, and the witness nevertheless demands a full-blown sup-
pression hearing to determine the legality of the order, there may be
room for striking a different accommodation between the due func-
tioning of the grand jury system and the federal wiretap statute.
Suppression hearings in these circumstances would result in pro
tracted interruption of grand jury proceedings ...and, in any event,
the deterrent value of excluding the evidence will be marginal at
best.
[VOL. 26: p. 667
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courts of appeals have developed two divergent approaches in attempting
to resolve this issue.40
The approach developed by the Second Circuit in In re Persico,41
posits that the seemingly inconsistent policy determinations of the Act
which require both the exclusion of illegally acquired evidence,42 and
the maintenance of unimpeded grand jury proceedings, 43 can be recon-
ciled by interpreting the statute to require exclusion only when it is
clear that the surveillance was illegal and a suppression hearing is
therefore unnecessary. 44 Thus, the Persico court held that a suppres-
sion hearing to test the legality of electronic surveillance need not be
given in contempt proceedings initiated after a grand jury witness was
granted use immunity but refused to answer questions on the ground
that they were the products of illegal electronic surveillance.4 5 The
40. See In re Special February, 1977 Grand Jury (Pavone), 570 F.2d 674,
678 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978) (in deciding the appeal
of a grand jury witness who was adjudged in contempt, the court reviewed
the holdings of the other courts of appeals).
Compare In re Special February, 1977 Grand Jury (Pavone), 570 F.2d 674(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); United States v. Morales,
566 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Gordon, 534 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1976); In
re Millow, 529 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Worobyzt), 522 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976);
United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1975); Droback v. United
States, 509 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975) with In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Katsouros), 613 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Melick-
ian v. United States, 547 F.2d 416 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977);
In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1974); In re Lochiatto, 497 F.2d 803
(1st Cir. 1974).
For a discussion of the two approaches, see notes 41-49 and accompanying
text infra.
41. 491 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924 (1974). In Persico,
a grand jury witness who had been granted use and derivative use immunity
nonetheless refused to testify, contending that a particular question was the
product of illegal electronic surveillance. 491 F.2d at 1158. The government
conceded that this question was derived from electronic surveillance, but ar-
gued that the surveillance had been conducted pursuant to three valid court
orders. Id. The lower court judge inspected the court orders in camera,
found them to be proper, and refused to grant appellant's motion that a
suppression hearing be held to test the legality of the surveillance. Id.
42. See note 26 supra.
43. See note 28 supra.
44. 491 F.2d at 1161. The court reasoned that if the illegality of elec-
tronic surveillance can only be established through a plenary suppression hear-
ing, then the legislative aim of maintaining unimpeded grand jury proceedings
would be frustrated. Id. at 1161-62.
For examples of when it is clear that a suppression hearing is unnecessary,
see text accompanying note 46 infra.
45. 491 F.2d at 1162. The court was not persuaded by the appellant's
argument, based on legislative history, that a contempt proceeding is a pro-
ceeding in "another context" and, therefore, that the general proscription
against suppression hearings in grand jury proceedings does not apply to
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court further held that refusal to answer would only be permissible if
there was: 1) an absence of a necessary court order, or 2) a concession
from the government that the surveillance was not in conformity with
the statutory requirements, or 3) a prior adjudication that the surveil-
lance was unlawful.40
The First Circuit in In re Lochiatto,47 however, declared that in
interpreting sections 2515 and 2518(10)(a), the court must attempt to
reconcile the objectives of minimizing delay in grand jury proceedings,
securing the government's secrecy interests in sensitive materials, and
protecting the defendant's right to assert the defenses which Congress
had established in the Act.48 The court held, therefore, that there
should be an opportunity for inspection of the authorized application
of the Attorney General or his designate, the affidavits in support of
the court order, the court order itself, and an affidavit submitted by the
government indicating the length of time the surveillance was con-
ducted.49
jury's questions. Id. at 1161-62; see Senate Report, supra note 23, at 106,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2195. The Second
Circuit declared that the appellant's argument was unrealistic because the
contempt mechanism is so intimately connected with the grand jury proceedings
as to be a part of them. 491 F.2d at 1162. The court stated that to allow
a recalcitrant grand jury witness to expand the breadth of inquiry which is
permissible, in a contemporaneous contempt proceeding would impede the
smooth functioning of the grand jury. Id.
46. 491 F.2d at 1161. The Second Circuit has reaffirmed its position in
subsequent cases. See, e.g., United States v. Morales, 566 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1977); In re Millow, 529 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1976). For a review of the courts,
which have adopted this approach, see note 40 supra.
47. 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974). In Lochiatto, grand jury witnesses, who
had been granted use immunity, were held in contempt after refusing to
answer the questions of a special grand jury investigating the making or
financing of extortionate credit transactions. Id. at 804. For a discussion of
use immunity, see note 3 supra. The government asserted that the wiretaps
were authorized by court order. 497 F.2d at 804.
The defendants contended that, at a minimum, they had a right to in
camera review by the court of the materials used to support the court order.
Id. at 805. The defendants contended that they also had the right to examine
the court orders, the government affidavits and materials submitted to support
the order, and any products of the surveillance or reports to the court. Id.
at 805. In addition, the defendants requested a plenary evidentiary hearing
to test the legality of the surveillance. Id. The district court refused to
examine the court order or any of the government documents supporting that
order in the case of two of the grand jury witnesses. Id. In the case of the
other witness, the court denied discovery but reviewed in camera the court or-
ders authorizing the wiretaps and found them to be facially valid. Id.
48. 497 F.2d at 807.
49. Id. at 808. The court read the Act as "giving a witness the right to
avoid a Hobson's choice between jail and testimony by mounting at least a
limited challenge which, like a declaratory judgment,:can clarify his rights be-
fore he risks sanction." Id. at 807. The First Circuit has since reaffirmed
the Lochiatto decision. See In re Mintzer, 511 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1974). For a
4676 [VOL. 26: p. 667
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Against this background, the Third Circuit began its analysis in
Harkins by examining the language of sections 2515 and 2518(10)(a).50
The court first noted the omission of the grand jury proceeding from
those proceedings enumerated in section 2518(10)(a). 51 The court ex-
amined the legislative history of section 2518(10)(a) and concluded that
the procedures available for challenging the use of evidence in grand
jury proceedings are limited because of special solicitude for the in-
formal nature of the grand jury proceeding.52 The court noted that
the Supreme Court in Gelbard had partially resolved the tension be-
tween sections 2515 and 2518(10)(a) by allowing a recalcitrant witness
to defend against a charge of contempt on the ground that the ques-
tions were based on a presumptively illegal wiretap. 53
The Third Circuit next examined the decisions of the Second
Circuit in Persico 4 and the First Circuit in Lochiatto.55  The Third
Circuit, adopting the approach of Lochiatto as a pragmatic accommo-
dation of the competing interests in the case,5 6 concluded that Harkins
should be granted an opportunity to inspect the documents supporting
the court ordered wiretap. 57 The holding of the court was based on
its belief that a right of access to a court order and supporting mate-
rials, when the government can show no secrecy interest,58 should pro-
list of the courts of appeals which have adopted this approach, see note 40
supra.
50. 624 F.2d at 1164. For the text of § 2515, see note 26 supra. For the
text of § 2518(10)(a), see note 28 supra.
51. 624 F.2d at 1164-65. The Third Circuit also noted the definition of
"aggrieved person" provided by the Act. Id. For the text of this definition,
see note 29 supra.
52. 624 F.2d at 1165, citing Senate Report, supra note 23, at 106, reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2195.
53. 624 F.2d at 1165. For a discussion of Gelbard, see notes 33-39 and
accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit opined that the ambiguity of
the statutory language, as well as the pragmatic approach suggested by Justice
White's concurring opinion in Gelbard, have led to the conflict among the
courts of appeals as to the procedural rights of grand jury witnesses. 624 F.2d
at 1166. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
54. 624 F.2d at 1166. For a discussion of Persico, see notes 41-46 and
accompanying text supra.
55. 624 F.2d at 1166. For a discussion of Lochiatto, see notes 47-49 and
accompanying text supra.
56. 624 F.2d at 1166. The court defined three interests that must be ac-
commodated: 1) the defendant's interest under the statute in not answering
questions based on illegal wiretaps, 2) the government's interest in effective
grand jury investigations, and 3) the government's further interest in pro-
tecting the secrecy of sensitive information contained in the materials support-
ing the wiretap or in the logs of the wiretaps. Id.
57. Id.
58. The Third Circuit did not articulate any criteria with which to evalu-
ate when the government's secrecy interest would be sufficiently strong so as
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vide an important adversarial check and deterrent against the use of
illegal wiretaps, without undermining governmental concerns. 59 The
Third Circuit further opined that the right of access to the govern-
ment's supporting documents would not allow recalcitrant witnesses
to unduly lengthen the grand jury proceedings. 6o Thus, finding that
Harkins should have been allowed to examine the court order and the
supporting documents, 61 and been given a contempt hearing,62 the
Third Circuit vacated the district court's order holding Harkins in con-
tempt and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.63
rials. Id. at 1166-68. However, in Lochiatto, the First Circuit also discussed
the secrecy interest of the government, stating: "There is often sensitive material
contained in the reports and affidavits; there is a high premium placed on
secrecy, often to protect the witnesses .... " 497 F.2d at 803. For a dis-
cussion of Lochiatto, see notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra. In view
of the Third Circuit's explicit reliance on Lochiatto, it is submitted that,
at a minimum, the government's secrecy interest should be paramount when
dissemination of the court order or the supporting materials could endanger
any of the witnesses to the grand jury proceedings.
59. 624 F.2d at 1166. The Third Circuit noted a statement by the Su-
preme Court in Gelbard that §.2515 also serves the function of protecting the
integrity of the court by ensuring that the courts do not become partners to
illegal conduct. Id. at 1166-67. For a discussion of Gelbard, see notes 33-39
and accompanying text supra.
The Third Circuit stated that limiting examination of the materials sup-
porting the wiretap to an in camera examination by the judge would deprive
the witness of any real opportunity to assert his rights under the statute. 624
F.2d at 1167. The possibility would exist that a witness could be imprisoned
for refusing to answer questions based on an illegal wiretap, the legality of
which was untested by adversarial scrutiny. Id.
60. 624 F.2d at 1167. The court noted that the only cause of delay would
be the ex parte hearing to suppress sensitive evidence and that the govern-
ment could complete this as soon at it wished to. Id. If the government
raised a secrecy-of-information objection to the witness review of the materials,
the court declared that the proper procedure was for the judge to review the
materials in camera. Id. at 1167 n.l0.
The court was careful to note, however, that the witness should not have
a right to introduce his own evidence to test the sufficiency of the govern-
ment's documents. Id. at 1167. The court postulated that such a suppres-
sion hearing could cause unmanageable delay because witnesses might ask for
a continuance to gather and present evidence. Id.
61. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
62. The Third Circuit found that Harkins was required to have an oppor-
tunity for a contempt hearing. 624 F.2d at 1168. See In re Grand Jury In-
vestigation (Bruno), 545 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1976). In Bruno, the court held
that the language of the Recalcitrant Witness Act affords the witness a right
to a reasonable time to prepare for the contempt proceeding and an oppor-
tunity to present all defenses properly available to him. Id. at 388. See 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1976); note 11 supra.
63. 624 F.2d at 1167. In his dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc,
Judge Garth analogized the issue presented in the instant case to the consti-
tutional question of grand jury use of evidence derived from unlawful searches
and seizures. 624 F.2d at 1168-69 (denial of rehearing) (Garth, J., dissenting).
See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In Silver-
thorne Lumber, the Court held that grand jury subpoenas which were based
[VOL. 26: p. 667
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It is submitted that the Harkins decision represents a pragmatic
balancing of the defendant's interest in not answering questions based
on illegal wiretaps and the government's interest in effective grand jury
investigations.64 By asserting that the government's documents must
survive the crucible of some minimum degree of adversarial scrutiny,6 5
the Third Circuit protects the integrity of the court and the privacy
rights of grand jury witnesses more effectively than does the Second
Circuit approach.66 In so doing, the Third Circuit's decision is con-
sonant with the edict of Gelbard, which asserts the primacy of privacy
considerations in the passage of the Act.
6 7
It is further submitted that the Third Circuit correctly rejected the
rationale of those circuits which have adopted the Second Circuit's
position in In re Persico.68 The Persico analysis, that the contempt
mechanism employed to coerce testimony is so intimately connected
with the grand jury proceeding as to really be a part of those pro-
ceedings, 69 is difficult to reconcile with Gelbard since the Supreme
Court based the Gelbard decision, in part, on the premise that con-
on illegally seized evidence were invalid. Id. at 391-92. In United States v.
Calandra, the Court held that a witness summoned to appear before a grand jury
could not refuse to answer questions on the grounds that they were based on a
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. 414 U.S. at 354-55.
See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra. The Calandra court dis-
tinguished Silverthorne, by stating that in Silverthorne, prior to the issuance
of the subpoenas, there had been an adjudication that the search and seizure
upon which the subpoenas were based were illegal. 414 U.S. at 352 n.8. In
Calandra, it would have been necessary to interrupt the grand jury proceed-
ings to determine the legality of the search. Id. Judge Garth stated that, by
analogy, there was no reason to allow a witness who could not be harmed to
litigate the legality of a wiretap as long as the questions the witness is asked
to answer are not derived from obviously unlawful electronic surveillance.
624 F.2d at 1168 (denial of rehearing) (Garth, J., dissenting).
64. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
65. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
66. Under the Second Circuit's approach, the grand jury witness is not
afforded any opportunity to examine the documents supporting the authoriza-
tion of the wiretap. See text accompanying note 46 supra. By contrast, under
the Third Circuit's approach, the witness is able to examine the court order
authorizing the surveillance, the application for an affidavit supporting the
court order, and the government affidavit indicating the length of time of the
surveillance. See text accompanying note 57 supra. It is submitted that the
Third Circuit's decision, enabling the witness to make a determination that
the government documents are facially valid and that the government com-
plied with the procedural requirements of the Act, affords a grand jury wit-
ness a better opportunity to assert his rights under the Act. By asserting his
rights, the grand jury witness will also help ensure that the courts do not
become partners in the illegal acts of Government agents. For a discussion of
the Gelbard Court's assertion of this interest, see note 37 supra.
67. For a discussion of the Court's rationale in Gelbard, see notes 37-38
and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 45-46 and accompanying text supra.
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tempt hearings are proceedings which are separate and distinct from
grand jury proceedings. 70
It is further suggested, however, that in striking a balance between
the competing interests in this case, 71 the Third Circuit should have
afforded the grand jury witness a right to introduce evidence testing
the factual sufficiency of the evidence contained in the government
documents supporting the wiretaps. 72 Since the Third Circuit has held
that the language of the Recalcitrant Witness Act 73 affords the witness
a reasonable time to prepare for a contempt hearing and an opportunity
to present all defenses properly available to him, 74 it is submitted that
the grand jury witness should be afforded, at least to the extent that it
will not unduly delay the grand jury proceedings, an opportunity to
present evidence to establish the defense that the government's elec-
tronic surveillance violated the Act.75
Until the Supreme Court provides a definitive answer, the court of
appeals will remain divided on whether, and to what extent, a grand
jury witness may challenge the legality of a facially valid court au-
thorized wiretap. 76 In attempting to resolve this question, it is sug-
gested that the Supreme Court should consider the possibility of allowing
the grand jury witness an opportunity to introduce evidence to establish
70. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
71. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
72. The Third Circuit stated that a witness had no such right to introduce
his own evidence. See 624 F.2d at 1167; note 60 supra.
73. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
74. See In re Grand Jury Investigations (Bruno), 545 F.2d 385, 388 (3d
Cir. 1976).
75. It is submitted that if the amount of time granted a witness to pro-
duce evidence is limited to the reasonable time period which he already has
to prepare for the contempt hearing, then no undue delay in the grand jury
proceedings should occur. Even a witness's appeal from an adverse decision
of the district court in such a case should not unduly delay the grand jury
proceedings, because the appeal must be disposed of within thirty days.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(b) (1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Katsouros), 613
F.2d 1171, 1175 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Admittedly, allowing a witness a limited
amount of time to gather evidence will impose a greater burden on the govern-
ment to ensure the legality of their wiretapping operations than was imposed
by the Lochiatto court. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra. Other
courts have also found it desirable, however, to impose more stringent burdens
on the government. See Melickian v. United States, 547 F.2d 416, 420 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977) (the government must make a mini-
mal showing of the necessity to avoid delay or preserve secrecy before the
witness' right to inspect the documents can be denied); In re Mintzer, 511
F.2d 471, 473 (1st Cir. 1974) (the government must swear by affidavit that it
did not conceal the use of any wiretaps from the witness, or use any of the
taps which the court determines to be illegal, in the formulation of questions
to the witness). For a discussion of illegality of surveillance as a defense to a
refusal to testify, see note 36 and accompanying text supra.
76. The Supreme Court has on four occasions declined to grant certiorari
to cases addressing this issue. See note 40 supra.
[VOL. 26: p. 667
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that the government's surveillance was unlawful. In the absence of an
opportunity to present evidence, it is further suggested that the Third
Circuit's approach represents the proper standard to follow, because it
best balances the need for efficient government investigations with the
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SELF-INCRIMINATION - MIRANDA WARNINGS
ARE NOT A PREREQUISITE TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE GIVEN BY
AN ARMED SUSPECT WHO HAS BARRICADED HIMSELF AWAY
FROM THE DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE CONTROL OF THE POLICE.
United States v. Mesa (1980)
Upon being informed that Rigoberto Mesa had shot his common-
law wife and daughter on January 28, 1980,1 agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) searched for and located Mesa, who had
barricaded himself in a motel room.2 Following Mesa's refusal to re-
spond to requests to surrender,3 the FBI's hostage negotiator for the
area (Agent) was called in.4 The Agent talked with Mesa for approxi-
mately three and one-half hours in a taped conversation5 in which
Mesa made several inculpatory statements regarding the events sur-
rounding the shooting.6 The Agent primarily adopted the role of a
1. United States v. Mesa, 487 F. Supp. 562, 563 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 638 F.2d
582 (3d Cir. 1980). Both victims survived and later that day informed the
FBI of the shooting. 487 F. Supp. at 563. While it is not entirely clear from
either opinion, it would appear that the shooting took place on a federal
military reservation, thus involving the FBI in the investigation. See 487 F.
Supp. at 563 (defendant charged under 28 U.S.C. § 113 (1976) governing
assaults on federal reservations); id. at 564 (FBI accompanied by military police
during investigation).
2. 487 F. Supp. at 563. At approximately 2:00 p.m. on January 29, three
FBI agents went to the El Sombrero Motel in Browns Mills, New Jersey and
learned that Mesa had barricaded himself in his room sometime before 10:00
a.m. that day. Id. The agents then evacuated the rooms on each side of
Mesa's room and blocked off traffic in the area, thus preventing ingress and
egress to the motel. Id. at 563-64. In less than 20 minutes, nearly 30 law
enforcement officials had arrived on the scene and surrounded the motel. Id.
at 564.
3. Id. at 564. The agents, using a bullhorn, stated: "Mr. Mesa, this is
the FBI, we have a warrant for your arrest, come out with your hands raised."
Id. When Mesa did not respond, the statement was repeated between 10
and 12 times over the course of approximately one hour. Id.
4. Id. Since the FBI agents on the scene believed Mesa to be armed and
were concerned that he might have taken hostages, they deemed it inadvisable
to forcibly take Mesa into their custody and called in the hostage negotiator.
Id.
5. Id. at 563. The tape recording of the beginning five percent of the
conversation was missing and the only evidence of its contents was the Agent's
testimony that he began the conversation by introducing himself, identifying
himself as an FBI agent specializing in hostage negotiation, and telling Mesa
that he was there to help him. Id. at 565.
6. Id. at 563. The court did not elaborate on the specific inculpatory
statements made by Mesa. See id. at 563-68. During the conversation, Mesa
also discussed other events of his life, such as his experiences in Vietnam, his
(682)
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listener as he attempted to establish a relationship of trust with Mesa.'
After he surrendered peacefully, Mesa was given the warnings 8 required
by Miranda v. Arizona.9
Since Mesa was not given his Miranda warnings during his con-
versation with the Agent, 0 he moved to suppress the contents of the
taped conversation at his trial." The district court granted the motion
relationship with his family during his childhood in Cuba, and his relationship
with his common-law wife and children. Id. at 565.
7. Id. at 564-65. The Agent's role, for the most part, consisted of passive
listening, as he had been informed that Mesa had been under psychiatric care
and might have suicidal tendencies. Id. at 564. The Agent stated that his
function and purpose was "to defuse a volatile situation in which lives might
have been lost." Id. at 564-65. Therefore, he made supportive comments
which seemed to be designed to keep Mesa talking in order to establish the
relationship of trust. Id.
8. Id. at 565. After he had surrendered, Mesa thanked the Agent for
listening to him and stated that he would have killed himself had it not been
for the Agent. 638 F.2d at 584.
Prior to the start of the phone conversation, Mesa had passed three notes
under the door of his motel room. 487 F. Supp. at 564. Mesa indicated in
the notes that he would eventually surrender, but that he needed more time.
Id. He also stated that he needed to see a psychiatrist because an "inner
voice" was bothering him. Id.
9. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For the required warnings, see note 17 infra.
10. 487 F. Supp. at 563.
11. Id. at 563. The defense moved for the suppression of the evidence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1976). 487 F. Supp. at 563. A suppression
hearing was then held in order to ascertain the facts surrounding the con-
versation between Mesa and the Agent. Id.
Section 3501 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States . ..
a confession, . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge
shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to volun-
tariness ...
(b) The trial judge, in determining the issue of voluntariness shall
take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving
of the confession, including . . . (3) whether or not such defendant
was advised or knew that he was not required to make any state-
ment and that any such statement could be used against him, (4)
whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning
of his right to the assistance of counsel; . . .
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in
evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any person
to any other person without interrogation by anyone, or at any time
at which the person who made or gave such confession was not under
arrest or other detention.
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to suppress,' 2 finding that the conversation constituted a "custodial in-
terrogation" 13 within the meaning of Miranda.'4
On an interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit 15 reversed, holding that an armed suspect who is
possibly holding hostages and who barricades himself away from the
direct and immediate control of the police is not in custody, and, there-
fore, Miranda warnings need not be given as a prerequisite to the
admission of his statements into evidence at trial. United States v.
Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
In Miranda,6 the United States Supreme Court ruled that when a
suspect is confronted by law enforcement officers, he must be given cer-
tain warnings in order to protect his fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. 17 The Court stated that the privilege can
12. 487 F. Supp. at 563. The district court held that although the Agent's
main purpose was to resolve the situation, he also had a secondary purpose of
gathering information concerning Mesa's involvement in the criminal assault
with which he was subsequently charged. Id. at 565.
13. Id. at 566. The district court held that since Mesa could not have
had a reasonable expectation of being allowed to go free, or even of being
able to escape, he was in custody for Miranda purposes. Id. For a further
discussion of the definition and scope of the term "custodial interrogation,"
see notes 19-37 and accompanying text infra.
14. 487 F. Supp. at 566. For a further discussion of Miranda, see notes
16-25 and accompanying text infra.
15. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz, Judge Adams, and Judge
Charles R. Weiner of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Chief Judge Seitz wrote the opinion
of the court, Judge Adams filed a concurring opinion, and Judge Weiner
dissented.
16. 384 U.S. 436 (1966), noted in 12 VILL. L. Rxv. 198 (1966). Miranda
consolidated four separate cases dealing with the fifth amendment: Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (defendant was arrested and taken to a special
interrogation room, where he later confessed); Vignera v. New York, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (defendant was picked up in connection with a robbery and
taken to police headquarters, where he made an oral confession; he was later
formally arrested and taken to another police station, where he signed an
inculpatory statement); Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (de-
fendant was arrested and interrogated on the night of the arrest, the next
morning, and the next afternoon, at which time he signed a confession fol-
lowing a two and one-half hour session); California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (defendant was arrested, held for five days, and interrogated on nine
separate occasions before he signed an inculpatory statement). 384 U.S. at
491-99. In each case the Court held that the suspect's fifth amendment rights
had been violated. Id.
For a general discussion of the issues involved in Miranda, see Interroga-
tion of Criminal Defendants - some views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35 FomD-
HAM L. Rlv. 169 (1966) (due to the controversy caused by the Miranda deci-
sion, the Editorial Board of the Fordham Law Review invited eight scholars
to express their views on the case).
17. 384 U.S. at 479. Miranda requires that the suspect:
be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
[VOL. 26: p. 682
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only be protected when the suspect is guaranteed the right "to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will." 18 After concluding that the modern methods of interrogation
often compel a suspect to speak, 19 the Miranda Court held that the
warnings must be given to any person who is the subject of a "custodial
interrogation." 20 The Court defined "custodial interrogation" as "ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." 21 If the suspect is not given the warnings prior
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
any questioning if he so desires.
Id.
The fifth amendment requires that "[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. 384 U.S. at 460, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The
Court stated that "our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government, when seeking to punish an individual, produce the evidence
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple,
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." 384 U.S. at 460, citing
Chambers v. Florida, 390 U.S. 227, 235-38 (1940).
19. 384 U.S. at 461. The Court stated that "[an individual swept from
familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces,
and subjected to the techniques of persuasion . . . cannot be otherwise than
under compulsion to speak." Id.
In discussing interrogation techniques, the Miranda Court did not spe-
cifically define what it meant by "interrogation," but rather simply viewed it
as questioning initiated by law enforcement officials in a setting in which the
suspect is cut off from the outside world. Id. at 445. The term was recently
defined, however, in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), where the
Court held that:
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody
is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only
to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect.
Id. at 300-01 (footnotes omitted).
The Court also stated that:
[A]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual sus-
ceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be
an important factor in determining whether the police should have
known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.
Id. at 302 n.8.
20. 384 U.S. at 444.
21. Id. The Court found that "the very fact of custodial interrogation
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of indi-
viduals." Id. at 455 (footnote omitted). In each of the four cases, the Court
held that the interrogation environment was "created for no purpose other
than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." Id. at 457. The
significance of having a suspect in custody is indicated by the fact that police
manuals which discuss interrogation techniques stress the importance of iso-
lating the suspect in unfamiliar surroundings and the importance of patience
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to such questioning, then any statements stemming from the custodial
interrogation are deemed to be compelled in violation of his fifth amend-
ment rights and, thus, are inadmissible.22
While the Court attempted to protect suspects' fifth amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, it also stated that its de-
cision was not intended to hamper the traditional function of police
officers in investigating crime. 23 Consequently, the warnings are not re-
quired in situations where an officer asks general questions regarding
what has just occurred upon his arrival at the scene of the crime, 24 since
449-51. See generally F. INBAU &c J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CON-
FESSIONS (1967). Therefore, the Court noted, unless a suspect is properly in-
formed of his constitutional rights, his will to resist the inherently compelling
pressures will be undermined and he will be compelled to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely. 384 U.S. at 467.
For a discussion of Miranda and "custodial interrogations," see N. SOBEL,
THE NEW CONFESSION STANDARDS - MIRANDA V. ARIZONA (1966); Graham,
What Is "Custodial Interrogation?": California's Anticipatory Application of
Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 59 (1967); Smith, The Threshold
Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation, 25
S.C. L. REV. 699 (1974).
22. 384 U.S. at 444. The warnings are necessary procedural safeguards,
designed to inform the accused of his right to silence and to assure him a
continuous opportunity to exercise it. Id. The Miranda Court did mention
that other fully effective means could be used to inform the defendant of his
constitutional rights. Id. For a discussion of what the Miranda rights re-
quire, see note 17 supra.
Once the defendant is made aware of his rights, he may waive them, pro-
vided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 384 U.S.
at 444. The heavy burden of proving such a waiver rests on the government.
Id. at 475, citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Regardless of whether Miranda warnings are given, any statement must
be scrutinized for voluntariness before it can be admitted into evidence.
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961). If a defendant's statements
are not voluntary, then their admission would violate the due process rights
guaranteed the defendant under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at
541. In deciding a voluntariness claim, the court must focus on "whether the
behavior of the .. . law enforcement officials was such as to overbear peti-
tioner's will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-deter-
mined . . . ." Id. at 544.
23. 384 U.S. at 477. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
24. 384 U.S. at 477. The Court stated that "[g]eneral on-the-scene ques-
tioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens
in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding." Id. For the ap-
plication of the "on-the-scene" exception in the courts of appeals, see, e.g.,
United States v. Quinones-Gonzalez, 452 F.2d 964, 965 (10th Cir. 1971) (Miranda
not applicable where police checked the license plate of defendants' car while
defendants were being treated at a hospital for heroin withdrawal); Utsler v.
Erickson, 440 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971)
(Miranda not applicable when the police ask preliminary questions of iden-
tification and questions concerning the recent whereabouts of people under
suspicion while investigating a probable offense); United States v. Pridgen,
435 F.2d 152, 153 (5th Cir. 1970) (Miranda not applicable to police question-
ing of a suspect under suspicious circumstances); United States v. Tobin, 429
F.2d 1261, 1263 (8th Cir. 1970) (Miranda not applicable to questioning of
defendant during a routine traffic stop); United States v. Robertson, 425 F.2d
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the compelling atmosphere inherent in an in-custody interrogation is
not necessarily present.25
Following Miranda, courts had difficulty defining the scope of the
term "custodial interrogation." 26 The Supreme Court then attempted
to clarify this issue in a series of cases.27 In Mathis v. United States,28
the Court found that the reason for the suspect's custody was unin-
portant,29 and held that Miranda applies to the interrogation of a
suspect concerning one crime while he is already in prison for commit-
ting another.8 0 In Orozco v. Texas,31 the Court stated that "custody"
is not restricted to interrogation in a police station or jail, and held
that Miranda is applicable to an interrogation in a suspect's bedroom.
3 2
1386, 1387-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 867 (1970) (Miranda not ap-
plicable to questions regarding the ownership of the car which the defendant
is driving when the car is believed to be stolen); United States v. Thomas.
396 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1968) (Miranda not applicable when there is an
on-the-scene investigation when defendants are not restrained, are questioned
on a public street, and are neither frisked nor searched on the street); Sciberras
v. United States, 380 F.2d 732, 734 (10th Cir. 1967) (Miranda not applicable
to asking defendant's name at the time of arrest).
25. 384 U.S. at 477-78. The Court also stated that all voluntary statements
are admissible, as the "fundamental import of the privilege while an individual
is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the
benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated." Id.
at 478. For a discussion of the voluntariness issue, see notes 18-22 and accom-
panying text supra.
26. See Smith, supra, note 21 at 706-24. The most litigated issues in the
area of "custodial interrogation" concern when the defendant is considered to
be in custody and whether he gave the statements sought to be introduced.
Id. at 706.
27. See notes 28-37 and accompanying text infra.
28. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
29. Id. at 4-5. The government sought to narrow the scope of Miranda by
arguing that it was only applicable to the questioning of a suspect who is in
custody in connection with the case under investigation. Id. at 4. The Court
found no substance to such a distinction, and also rejected an argument that
tax investigations are immune from the Miranda requirements. Id.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that the majority was ex-
tending Miranda, since the custody and questioning were unrelated and since
Miranda dealt with a suspect who was thrust into unfamiliar surroundings, and
so even though the defendant in Mathis was confined, he was in familiar sur-
roundings at the time of interrogation. Id. at 6-7 (White, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the importance of the nature of the surroundings, see notes 19-21
and accompanying text supra.
30. 391 U.S. at 3. While serving a sentence in state prison for an unrelated
offense, the defendant was questioned by an Internal Revenue Service Agent
regarding allegedly fraudulent tax refund claims. Id. at 3 n.2. Oral statements
and documents given by the defendant were later used to help convict him of
knowingly filing false claims against the government. Id. at 3. The government
agent never gave the defendant his Miranda warnings. Id. at 2-3.
31. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
32. Id. at 325-26. In Orozco, the defendant was a suspect in a killing and
had returned to his boardinghouse to sleep. Id. at 325. At about 4:00 a.m.,
four officers were admitted by an unidentified woman, entered the defendant's
bedroom, and began to question him. Id. One of the officers testified that from
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The Orozco Court further held that Miranda applies whenever there
is a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom, regardless of the
place of interrogation.88
In Oregon v. Mathiason,4 the Court interpreted "significant de-
privation of freedom" to mean restriction of the suspect's freedom of
movement.8 5 The Mathiason Court refused to extend Miranda to a
case where the suspect voluntarily went to the police station and was
told that he was not under arrest and was free to go at any time.3 6 The
Court held that "Miranda warnings are required only where there is
such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' " 87
In determining whether a suspect is "in custody" for Miranda pur-
poses, most courts of appeals have adopted an objective test which re-
quires that the court decide whether the officer did something that
would indicate that the suspect was not free to leave at will.38 As a
arrest." Id. Statements made by the defendant were then used to help convict
him. Id. at 325-26.
33. Id. at 327. For a discussion of "custodial interrogation" in Miranda,
see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
34. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
35. Id. at 495.
36. Id. at 493. In Mathiason, a State Police officer investigating a theft
had left a note at the defendant's apartment asking him to call. Id. When the
defendant called the next day, he agreed to meet the officer at the state patrol
office that afternoon. Id. The officer took the defendant into his office and the
defendant confessed after falsely being told that his fingerprints were found at
the scene. Id. The officer then taped the confession after advising the de-
fendant of his Miranda rights. Id. at 494.
37. Id. at 495. The Court held that Miranda is not applicable to a non-
custodial situation merely because the questioning takes place in a "coercive
environment." Id. The Court also stated that the warning requirement is not
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the police station, or
because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Id.
A similar decision was reached in United States v. Beckwith, 425 U.S. 341
(1976). The defendant was read all of his rights, except for his right to have an
attorney present, before IRS agents questioned him in his temporary home.
Id. at 342-43. Following the interview, the defendant allowed the agents to
inspect certain records at his place of employment. Id. at 343-44. The Court
held that the statements made by the defendant were admissible, since Miranda
does not extend to non-custodial circumstances and the defendant was neither
arrested nor detained against his will. Id. at 344-45.
38. See Smith, supra note 21, at 710-14. The advantage of an objective
test is that it is "not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of
the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden
of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they ques-
tion." Id. at 713, quoting People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 9, 233 N.E.2d 255, 260,
286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 (1967). See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 602 F.2d 139
(7th Cir. 1979); Borodine v. Douzanis, 592 F.2d 1202 (1st Cir. 1979); United
States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
The Ninth Circuit has phrased the objective test in the form of a reason-
able man standard which requires the court to determine whether a suspect can
reasonably believe that he cannot leave freely. United States v. Luther, 521
F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1975), citing Lowe v. United States, 407 F.2d 1391, 1397
(9th Cir. 1969). The factors to be considered under the Ninth Circuit's test are
"the language used to summon [the suspect], the physical surroundings of the
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result of the application of this test, holdings have emerged from the
various circuits that Miranda warnings are not necessary: 1) when a
suspect is stopped at customs but allowed to go free; 39 2) when the
suspect is free to go even though he is the "focus" of the investigation; 40
3) when the suspect voluntarily submits to an interview and has the
freedom to leave; 41 4) when the suspect is questioned in an on-the-
street encounter; 42 5) when no interrogation tactics are used; 43 or 6)
interrogation, the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt,
and pressure exerted to detain him." Id.
Other tests which have been advanced to determine whether a defendant is
"in custody" for Miranda purposes include the focus test and the subjective test.
Smith, supra note 21, at 707-11. Under the focus test, the court looks to see
whether the investigation has switched from a general inquiry of an unsolved
crime, into an investigation centered on a particular suspect. Id. at 707. See
United States v. Phelps, 443 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court,
however, has stated that focus alone may not be enough to establish custody.
United States v. Beckwith, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). See also note 40 infra.
For a further discussion of Beckwith, see note 37 supra.
Under the subjective test, the suspect's belief as to whether he is "in
custody" is controlling. Smith, supra, at 711. The subjective test is based on
the view that "the person who honestly but unreasonably thinks he is under
arrest has been subjected to precisely the same custodial pressures as the person
whose belief in this regard is reasonable." Id., quoting LaFave, "Street En-
counters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 39, 99 (1968). See also, Rothblatt &c Pitler, Police Interrogation: Warn-
ings and Waivers - Where Do We Go From Here?, 42 NoTRE DAME LAW. 479,
485 (1968).
39. United States v. Luther, 521 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1975). The defendant
was stopped at customs and an inspection revealed 3,600 laetrile capsules in
her car trunk. Id. at 409. The customs agent seized the capsules and allowed
the defendant to leave. Id. at 410. She was arrested at her home the next
day. Id.
40. United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 990 (1970). A bank robbery witness' description of the robber's car led
police to the defendant, who was then interviewed at his apartment. 421 F.2d
at 541-42. The court held that focus alone did not trigger a need for Miranda
warnings. Id. at 543.
The Supreme Court reached a conclusion similar to the Second Circuit's
in United States v. Beckwith, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). For a discussion of
Beckwith, see note 37 supra.
41, United States v. Freije, 408 F.2d 100 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
859 (1969). The defendant was a suspect in a case involving the interstate
transportation of stolen automobiles. 408 F.2d at 101. He was voluntarily
interviewed at the police station and was free to leave at any time. Id. at
102-03.
42. United States v. Jimenez, 602 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1979). After trailing
the defendant for 10 miles, the police stopped her and asked what she had in
her trunk. Id. at 141. The court held that the absence of any physical or
verbal threats, or any other special circumstances, prevented the creation of a
custodial atmosphere. Id. at 144.
43. United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968). The defendant
was questioned in front of a tavern concerning a stolen vehicle. Id. at 375.
The court held that Miranda was inapplicable since there was no record of any
"element of accusation, deception, suggestion, or other tactics calculated to
overawe, like those condemned in Miranda." Id. at 376. For a discussion of
the coercion existing in Miranda, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
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when the overall atmosphere is one of cooperation and not of compul-
sion.4" In each case, the controlling factor was that the suspect had
the freedom to leave and could thereby avoid any compulsion to speak
against his will.4
5
The Third Circuit has recognized that the term "custodial inter-
rogation" as it applies to pre-arrest questioning of suspects for Miranda
purposes is not amenable to precise definition.46 The court has ex-
plained that each case must be decided on its own facts, 4 7 but has, in
scrutinizing those facts, utilized an objective test which evaluates
whether the government restrained the suspect's freedom in some mean-
ingful way.48 In applying the test in the absence of an actual arrest,
the court has stated that, "something must be done or said by the
authorities, either in their manner of approach or in the tone or extent
of their questioning which indicates that they would not have heeded
a request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so." 49 In Government
of Virgin Islands v. Berne,50 the Third Circuit found Miranda to be
inapplicable to questions addressed to a suspect not under arrest and
who was permitted to go home following the questioning.51 Similarly,
44. United States v. Harris, 611 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1979). FBI agents went
to the defendant's motel room and asked him if he had a gun, at which time
the defendant showed them where he kept a loaded pistol. Id. at 171. The
court held that Miranda was inapplicable since "[t]he overall atmosphere . . .
was clearly one of cooperation and not one of compulsion." Id. at 173.
45. For a discussion of the importance of the suspect's being free to leave,
see notes 19-37 and accompanying text supra.
46. United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 820 (1970). The court stated that "an exact definition for 'custodial inter-
rogation' is, by its nature, an impossibility." 425 F.2d at 832. The Clark court
held that a person detained on the street for purposes of an inquiry concerning
a minor violation, but not placed under arrest, is not entitled to Miranda
warnings. Id. For the Miranda Court's discussion of "custodial interrogation,"
see notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
47. United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 820 (1970).
48. Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1002 (1974), citing United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 1970).
The Steigler court stated that in the absence of restraint under the objective
test, the inherent pressures which Miranda warnings were intended to neutralize
simply do not exist. 496 F.2d at 798. See generally Y. KAMISAR, "CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION" WITHIN THE MEANING OF MIRANDA, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTION 335-83 (1968).
For an endorsement of the objective test, see Lederer, Miranda v. Arizona -
The Law Today, 78 MIL. L. REV. 107, 130-33 (1978). For a discussion of the use
of the objective test among the other circuits, see notes 38-45 and accompanying
text supra.
49. Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1002 (1974), quoting United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 544-45 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970).
50. 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
51. 412 F.2d at 1057. The police had been informed by a rape victim that
her dress and undergarments were in the trunk of her assailant's car. Id. Her
description led police to the defendant, who was soon questioned at his home.
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in Steigler v. Anderson,52 the Third Circuit held that an arson suspect
was not entitled to Miranda warnings when he was questioned four
separate times before being charged,5 3 since he was always free to
leave.5 4
Against this background, Chief Judge Seitz began his analysis in
Mesa by examining the precepts underlying the Miranda rule.55 He
recognized that the Miranda warnings were not intended to unduly
interfere with a proper system of law enforcement or to hamper the
police's traditional investigatory functions.5 6 The Chief Judge then
stated that in deciding whether there has been a "custodial interroga-
Id. He gave the police the clothes and went to the police station with the two
officers who had questioned him. Id. The defendant was not arrested or
restrained in any way and was later permitted to return to his home alone. Id.
He was first given his Miranda rights when he arrived at the police station.
Id. The defendant was later arrested when he and his father attempted to see
the victim at her hotel. Id. At trial, defense counsel objected to the intro-
duction of the victim's clothes on the grounds that the defendant had not been
given his Miranda rights. Id.
The court focused on the defendant's freedom of action and on the fact
that he was not "thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menac-
ing police interrogation procedures." Id. at 1059, quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. at 457. The court contrasted the defendant's situation with that of
Miranda's, and found the fact that Miranda was held incommunicado in a
police interrogation room to be significant. 412 F.2d at 1059. The court also
found "no evidence of the application of force or intimidation, physical or
psychological, actual or implied." Id. at 1060. It also held that "the mere
presence of the police at the subject's home cannot be equated, per se, with the
deprivation of significant freedom of action with which the Court in Miranda
dealt." Id. at 1059-60.
52. 496 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974).
53. 496 F.2d at 795. Following a fire in the defendant's home, evidence of
arson was uncovered and the defendant became one of the suspects. Id. at
794-95. The defendant was then interviewed by the police on four separate
occasions within five days of the time of the fire. Id. at 795. The defendant
was not read his Miranda rights before any of the four interrogatories. Id.
54. Id. at 800. The district court listed five factors which the Third Circuit
affirmed as being significant for purposes of determining that there was no
custodial interrogation:
(1) There was a complete absence of restraint of petitioner's liberty
(2) The interrogations were routine and courteous in character;
(3) There [was] no evidence that the investigation had "focused"
on petitioner .. .;
(4) Petitioner was a young and intelligent man, a college graduate,
and [was] not to be easily cowed or intimidated by police presence;
(5) The times of the interrogations seemed to be reasonable, sub-
ject to petitioner's convenience and not unduly prolonged.
Id., quoting Steigler v. Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 1286, 1291 (D. Del. 1973).
55. 638 F.2d at 582. The court again recognized that "custodial inter-
rogation" is not susceptible of an exact definition, so each situation must be
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 584. See note 46 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of the precepts underlying Miranda, see notes
17-22 and accompanying text supra.
56. 638 F.2d at 584. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
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tion," two distinct inquiries are necessary.57 First, the court must de-
termine whether the suspect was "in custody" for Miranda purposes.5 8
Second, if custody is found to exist, the court must determine whether
the suspect was interrogated.5 9
In analyzing the custody issue, Chief Judge Seitz first stated that
Miranda warnings are required in order to protect a suspect from the
compulsion inherent in an in-custody interrogation. 60 Concentrating on
the Supreme Court's perceived dangers of the custodial interrogation
process, Chief Judge Seitz stated that the warnings were designed for
situations in which the police can restrain the suspect, subject him to
their questioning, and apply whatever psychological techniques they
think will be most effective. 61
Chief Judge Seitz next distinguished Mesa's situation from that
of Miranda.62 He found that the key differences between the two situa-
tions were: 1) the police did not have immediate control over Mesa's
actions; 63 2) the Agent was not alone in a room with Mesa such that
all distractions were eliminated; 64 and 3) the Agent could not control
57. 638 F.2d at 584-85. The court stated that the "custody" issue is to
be decided first, with the inquiry regarding "interrogation" arising once the
suspect is in custody. Id. at 585.
58. Id. For a discussion of "custody," see notes 19-37 and accompanying
text supra.
59. 638 F.2d at 585. Since Chief Judge Seitz held that Mesa was not in
custody within the meaning of Miranda, he did not reach the question of
whether the Agent's conversation with Mesa constituted "interrogation." Id.
at 589. For a discussion of "interrogation," see note 19 and accompanying
text supra.
60. 638 F.2d at 585. The court stated that the Miranda Court had viewed
the issuing of the warnings as necessary to ensure that any statement is the
product of free choice. Id. Chief Judge Seitz also emphasized that the fact
that in-custody interrogation takes place in private was central to the Miranda
decision. id. He then reviewed the Court's discussion of techniques in police
interrogation manuals, which stress the importance of isolation of the suspect
in a police-dominated atmosphere. Id. For a further discussion of the need
for the warnings, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
61. 638 F.2d at 585-86. The court stated that "the key aspect of the cus-
todial setting as described in Miranda is the isolation of the suspect in a room
that is dominated by the law enforcement officials who will interrogate him."
Id. The court also noted that in such a situation it is more feasible for the
police to give the suspect the warnings, since they need not be concerned that
giving the warnings may effect the suspect's desire to cooperate with the police.
Id. at 586. See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
62. 638 F.2d at 586.
63. Id. Chief judge Seitz stated that the FBI agents
could not compel Mesa even to listen to any questions they might
want to ask, much less subject him to the interviewing techniques or
'tricks' that concerned the Miranda Court. They had no power to
handcuff him or use other reasonable means to confine him in such
a manner that he had no choice but to listen to questioning.
Id.
64. Id. Chief Judge Seitz found it important that Mesa could terminate
the phone conversation at any time. Id.
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the substance of the conversation with Mesa. 65 The Chief Judge,
therefore, concluded that the FBI did not have the same power to wear
down Mesa's will that the Miranda Court believed exists in a custodial
setting.6
The Mesa court rejected the contention that the presence of officers
surrounding the motel established custody by depriving Mesa of his
freedom in a significant way.67 The court stated that the Miranda
Court's focus on the suspect's freedom to come and go must be con-
sidered in conjunction with the concerns of the custody requirements.6 8
Thus, once a suspect was within the immediate control of the police, the
proper inquiry to determine whether he is in custody would be to ask
if he were free to leave.6 9 However, the court stated that this inquiry
is not necessary until the suspect is isolated in a police-dominated at-
mosphere where the police have immediate control over him.70 Chief
Judge Seitz found that since the FBI never attained immediate control
over Mesa during the conversation, it was unnecessary for the court to
decide whether he was free to leave. 7' Having thus concluded that
Mesa was not in custody, the Chief Judge found it unnecessary to dis-
cuss the interrogation issue.72 Chief Judge Seitz did, however, limit
65. Id. Mesa controlled the direction of the conversation and chose the
topics of discussion. Id. The only indication in the conversation that the
Agent possibly attempted to direct the conversation came where he stated:
"Tell me what happened yesterday. What was the provacation?" Id. at 586
n.3. This was in direct response to Mesa's statement: "What happened yester-
day was a provocation. It was a provocation because I am not a criminal. I
am not a criminal. Because I didn't hurt anybody until I went to Viet Nam."
Id. at 586 n.3.
66. Id. at 586. Chief Judge Seitz emphasized that, unlike a suspect in a
custodial setting, Mesa retained the psychological advantage of being able to
"call the shots" to some degree. Id. at 587. Consequently, he concluded that
Mesa was not in "custody" within the meaning of Miranda. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. For a discussion of the concerns of the custody requirement, see
notes 19-37 and accompanying text supra.
69. 638 F.2d at 587. The court stated: "The Miranda Court's description
of the custodial setting demonstrates that, at a minimum, the police must have
immediate control over the suspect." Id.
For a further discussion of the freedom to leave analysis, see notes 19-37
and accompanying text supra.
70. 638 F.2d at 588. According to Chief Judge Seitz, until the police have
immediate control over the suspect, the potential for intimidation is not
present. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 589. For a general discussion of the interrogation issue, see
note 19 supra.
Chief Judge Seitz also found it unnecessary to discuss the voluntariness of
Mesa's statements, since Mesa never claimed that his statements were in-
voluntary. 638 F.2d at 589, citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737,
741-42 (1966) (when the issue of voluntariness is raised on appeal, the court
must examine the entire record and make an independent determination of
that ultimate issue). For a general discussion of the voluntariness issue, see
notes 18-22 and accompanying text supra.
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the court's holding to the particular factual situation involved in
Mesa.73
In a concurring opinion, Judge Adams, reversing the order in which
Chief Judge Seitz considered the issues, 74 concluded there was no
interrogation, 75 thus finding it unnecessary to reach the custody issue.76
Judge Adams based his conclusion on the fact that the Agent acted
primarily as a listener, not a questioner,77 and that Mesa made the
statements of his own volition.78 Recognizing the district court's finding
that the Agent had a secondary purpose of gathering possible evidence,
Judge Adams stated that it would be impractical and counterproductive
to require Miranda warnings in a sensitive situation such as the one in
Mesa.79 Finally, Judge Adams stated that although such statements
73. 638 F.2d at 589. Chief Judge Seitz recognized that in some situations
it would be unfair to admit statements made by a suspect under the condi-
tions similar to those in the present case. Id. The Mesa court merely con-
cluded that Miranda warnings are not a prerequisite to the admission into
evidence of statements made by an armed suspect who is not within the imme-
diate control of the police. Id.
Recognizing that the main principle behind Miranda is that a suspect
should not be compelled to speak against his will, Chief Judge Seitz also stated
that any statements must be closely scrutinized for voluntariness, even if
Miranda warnings are given. Id. Consequently, if the police use psycho-
logical trickery or other forms of overreaching to induce a suspect to incrimi-
nate himself, the statements can still be attacked on the ground that they
were compelled in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. For a gen-
eral discussion of voluntariness, see notes 18-22 Sc 25 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the principles behind Miranda, see notes 17-22 and
accompanying text supra.
74. 638 F.2d at 589 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams' order of dis-
cussing the issues appears to be contrary to the clear implication of Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis, the Supreme Court held that
"the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is sub-
jected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Id. at
300-01 (emphasis added). For a further discussion of Innis and the question
of "interrogation" in Miranda, see note 19 supra.
75. 638 F.2d at 589 (Adams, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 590-91 (Adams, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 589-90 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams noted that the
conversation was nonadversarial and noninquisitorial in nature. Id. at 590
(Adams, J., concurring). In his view, Mesa was not "subjugated to the will
of the examiner," which was the concern expressed in Miranda. Id. He saw
the Agent's purpose in the conversation as one of keeping Mesa from dwelling
on thoughts of suicide and of achieving a peaceful resolution of the con-
frontation. Id. For a further discussion of the Agent's purpose in the conver-
sation, see notes 4-7 and accompanying text supra.
78. 638 F.2d at 590 (Adams, J., concurring). For a further discussion of
the voluntariness requirement, see notes 18-22, 25 Se 72 and accompanying text
supra.
79. 638 F.2d at 590 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams reasoned that
negotiation is usually dependent on the negotiator establishing an atmosphere
of trust and understanding with the suspect and by giving Miranda warnings
an adversarial atmosphere is created from the outset. Id. In his view, "law
enforcement personnel should not be forced to make a pressured judgment as
to whether reading the Miranda warnings would deter the suspect from talk-
ing, when it is the chance to engage the suspect in a dialogue that holds the
main hope for saving lives." Id.
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were admissible, law enforcement officials should refrain from relying
on them, since future suspects may become more reluctant to negotiate
with the police if they fear statements made will be used at trial to
incriminate them.8 0
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Weiner analyzed the principles be-
hind the Miranda rule 81 and concluded that the deprivation of Mesa's
freedom of action was controlling.8 2 He disagreed with the distinctions
drawn by Chief Judge Seitz concerning whether or not Mesa was in
"custody" for Miranda purposes,83 and concluded that Mesa was under
the direct and immediate control of the authorities.s4 Judge Weiner
also stated that the fact that Mesa could terminate the conversation
was unimportant.8 5 After deciding that Mesa was in custody, Judge
Weiner further concluded that Mesa had been interrogated, since the
Agent did have the secondary purpose of obtaining information and he
80. Id. at 591 (Adams, J., concurring). In judge Adams' view, use of the
statements may indicate a breach of trust in the view of future suspects, thus
deterring them from trusting a police negotiator in a delicate situation similar
to one in the present case. Id.
81. 638 F.2d at 593-94 (Weiner, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
principles behind Miranda, see notes 17-21 and accompanying text supra.
82. 638 F.2d at 594 (Weiner, J., dissenting). Finding that "the initial ques.
tion to be considered is whether Mesa was 'in custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action' during the conversation with [the Agent]," Judge Weiner
held that the "seige atmopshere" at the scene indicated that Mesa was restrained
in his freedom of movement. Id. at 593 (Weiner, J., dissenting). Judge Weiner
also found that the lack of an arrest was unimportant since the Third Circuit
had previously held that in the absence of actual arrest, something must be said
or done by the authorities which indicates that they would not have heeded a
request to depart or to allow the suspect to do so. Id. at 594 (Weiner, J., dis-
senting). See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
83. 638 F.2d at 594 (Weiner, J., dissenting). Judge Weiner stated that
Chief Judge Seitz's opinion was based on the view that the police lacked "im-
mediate" control over Mesa, since no officers were actually present in the motel
room with Mesa. Id. For a discussion of Chief Judge Seitz's view, see notes
67-71 and accompanying text supra.
84. 638 F.2d at 594 (Weiner, J., dissenting). Judge Weiner found it sig-
nificant that Mesa was alone, locked inside of a motel room with only one exit,
and that the motel was surrounded by over 20 law enforcement officials who
had a warrant for his arrest. Id. He argued that Mesa was in a very real sense
under the direct and immediate control of the authorities, as he could have only
left the room in three possible ways: "dead, injured and under arrest, or un-
injured and under arrest." Id., quoting United States v. Mesa, 487 F. Supp. at
562. Consequently, Judge Weiner concluded that "the situation at the motel
was replete with the very same dangers to Mesa's Fifth Amendment rights as are
present in a station-house custody situation." 638 F.2d at 594 (Weiner, J., dis-
senting). For a discussion of the distinctions drawn by Chief Judge Seitz, see
notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
85. 638 F.2d at 595 (Weiner, J., dissenting). Judge Weiner disagreed with
Chief judge Seitz on the importance of this factor since he believed that the
overall "balance of power" was still with the authorities surrounding the motel.
Id. Also, any suspect can terminate a conversation with law enforcement
officials by simply refusing to speak to his interrogators. Id. Judge Weiner
also stated that the fact a suspect has the ability to terminate questioning does
not abrogate his rights. Id.
29
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did, in Judge Weiner's view, attempt to direct the course of the
conversation.86
It is submitted that the Mesa court, in denying the motion to
suppress, correctly interpreted and applied Miranda.8 7 The evils of in-
custody interrogation which first led the Supreme Court to develop
the Miranda warnings 8s were not present in the instant case.80 Mesa
was not held incommunicado, thrust into an unfamiliar environment,
or run through menacing police interrogation procedures.9 0 Mesa was
barricaded in his own motel room and allowed the FBI to communicate
with him at his own discretion; 91 thus, he was not subject to either
physical or psychological coercion similar to that mentioned in
Miranda.9 2
It is also submitted that, as Chief Judge Seitz correctly indicated,
the fact that Mesa was not free to leave the area did not create custody
for Miranda purposes.93 In each case before the Supreme Court where
86. Id. at 595-96 (Weiner, J., dissenting). Judge Weiner concluded that the
Agent's comments appeared calculated to bring about a peaceful end to the
standoff and to elicit information about the shootings. Id. at 596 (Weiner, J.,
dissenting). He also found that the Agent did direct express questions about
the shooting to Mesa. Id. But see note 65 and accompanying text supra.
Judge Weiner also found that the Agent's statements fell squarely within
the Supreme Court's definition of interrogation as "not only express questioning,
but also . . . any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 638
F.2d at 595 (Weiner, J., dissenting), quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 300-01 (1980). Judge Weiner reasoned that the Agent knew Mesa would
make incriminating responses to his questions since the Agent had established a
relationship of trust, which, coupled with Mesa's fear and confusion, increased
his susceptibility to persuasion. 638 F.2d at 596 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
87. For a discussion of Miranda, see notes 16-25 and accompanying text
supra.
88. For the evils surrounding the Miranda case, see notes 19-21 and accom-
panying text supra.
89. For a discussion of the facts of Mesa, see notes 2-9 and accompanying
text supra; notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
90. 638 F.2d at 583-84. The Miranda Court stated that the potential for
compulsion in each of the four cases was "forcefully apparent," since in each
case, "the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through
menacing police interrogation procedures." 384 U.S. at 457. The Miranda
Court stressed the importance of privacy, citing police manuals which state that
the "principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is
privacy - being alone with the person under interrogation." Id. at 449, quoting
F. INBAU ge J. REID, supra note 21, at 1 (footnote omitted). For a discussion
of Miranda, see notes 16-25 and accompanying text supra.
91. 638 F.2d at 583-84. In each case in Miranda, the defendants were at
the police station and were forced to listen to the police officers' questions.
384 U.S. at 491-99; note 16 supra. The fact that Mesa really controlled the
communications is indicated by the fact that although the Agent wanted to keep
the conversation going, Mesa took breaks whenever he so desired. 638 F.2d
at 586.
92. For a discussion of the coercion present in Miranda, see notes 19-21 and
accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 67-71 and accompanying text supra.
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Miranda has been applied there was an existing possibility that the
police could use either physical force or the psychological techniques
specified in the Miranda opinion 94 to compel a suspect to speak against
his will.95 In the present case the FBI could not even force Mesa to
listen to their questions, thus indicating a lack of immediate control
over him.9 6 In such a situation, the fact that Mesa's movement to and
from the area was restricted is unimportant, since the FBI still lacked
the power to wear down his will that was present in Miranda.9 7
The analysis of the Mesa court, it is also contended, reflects a de-
sire by the Third Circuit to abstain from unnecessarily hampering law
enforcement officials.9 8 By not requiring the warnings, the court does
not force police officers to decide whether to give an armed and barri-
caded suspect his Miranda rights before resolving the situation at hand.92
In reaching such a decision, it is contended, the court eases the burden
on the police and conforms with the expressed desires of the Miranda
Court. 0 0
In considering the impact of Mesa, it is evident that the Third
Circuit is not willing to extend the principles of Miranda when it may
operate to unduly hamper law enforcement officials. 101 It is suggested
that this decision restricts the scope of Miranda to situations in which
protection of a suspect's constitutional rights is most necessary - where
the police have direct and immediate control over the suspect and have
the greatest opportunity to compel him to speak against his will.102
94. For a discussion of the techniques for coercion in Miranda, see notes
19-21 and accompanying text supra.
95. In Miranda and the three accompanying cases, each suspect was either
arrested or at the police station, and was interrogated in private. See 384 U.S.
at 491-99; note 16 supra. In Mathis v. United States, the suspect was inter-
viewed while he was already in prison. See 391 U.S. at 3; notes 28-30 and
accompanying text supra. In Orozco v. Texas, the suspect, though not formally
arrested, was questioned while surrounded by the police in his bedroom. See
394 U.S. at 325; notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
96. 638 F.2d at 586. Since Mesa had the ability to hang up the phone, it is
clear he had the ability to prevent any communications, at least until the
situation was resolved.
97. See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
98. 638 F.2d at 588-89. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
99. 638 F.2d at 588. It could be argued that the police are not put in a
difficult situation, since by choosing not to give a suspect his rights the police
can still settle the situation, but must simply refrain from asking any questions.
However, a choice is still involved in situations where the suspect might be
ready to make a statement while he is still barricaded in his room. Id.
100. Id. at 588-89. For a discussion of the desires of the Miranda Court,
see notes 18-25 and accompanying text supra.
101. 638 F.2d at 588. The court stated that "extending Miranda to this
situation would put law enforcement officials to a delicate and difficult choice."
Id.
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It is also suggested that the court's decision will not open the way
for great abuses of suspects' rights by the police.108 In some situations,
an armed and barricaded suspect will be under such strain that his
statements will be considered to be involuntary, and therefore, inad-
missible. 0 4 In other situations, it may not be feasible for the police
negotiator to try to direct the conversation through questions, as the
suspect may be hostile toward any attempt to discover information
concerning his actions. 05
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Mesa court's decision ade-
quately provides protection for suspects' constitutional rights and also
avoids placing unnecessary burdens on law enforcement officials. It is
contended that even though the court has restricted the -scope of Mi-
randa to cases where the police have direct and immediate control of
the suspect, the Third Circuit has provided guidance to other courts
as to how the principles behind the Miranda decision can be applied
without putting added pressures on law enforcement officials.
Michael D. Venuti
103. For a discussion of the abuses perceived by the Miranda Court, see
notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
104. For a discussion of the voluntariness issue, see notes 18-22, 25 & 72
and accompanying text supra.
105. 638 F.2d at 588. As Chief Judge Seitz stated in his opinion: "[I]mplicit
in the Miranda holding is the notion that the police are in a position to give a
suspect his warnings." Id. However, when it is first necessary to establish a
relationship of trust, such warnings may not be feasible. Id. at 588-89.
Another factor which could prevent police abuses is the breach of trust
argument posited by Judge Adams in his concurring opinion. For a further
discussion of this argument, see note 80 and accompanying text supra.
[VOL. 26: p. 682
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss3/6
